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Abstract Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex introduce bipolar argumentation frame-
works by introducing a second relation on the arguments for representing the support
among them. The main drawback of their approach is that they cannot encode
defeasible support, for instance they cannot model an attack towards a support
relation. In this paper, we introduce a way to model defeasible support in bipolar
argumentation frameworks. We use the methodology of meta-argumentation in
which Dung’s theory is used to reason about itself. Dung’s well-known admissibility
semantics can be used on this meta-argumentation framework to compute the
acceptable arguments, and all properties of Dung’s classical theory are preserved.
Moreover, we show how different contexts can lead to the alternative strengthening
of the support relation over the attack relation, and converse. Finally, we present
two applications of our methodology for modeling support, the case of arguments
provided with an internal structure and the case of abstract dialectical frameworks.
This paper is the revised and extended version of the paper titled “Support in Abstract
Argumentation” published in the proceedings of the Third International Conference on
Computational Models of Argument (COMMA 2010) in September 2010 [10].
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1 Introduction
Support is a controversial, but central issue in classical approaches to argumentation
theory. Toulmin [27] proposes a model where support is a relation between data and
claims having that data sustains the claim, and the beliefs in Pollock’s [23] OSCAR1
are justified if and only if they are supported by an argument that is undefeated. In
Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation [15], support is not explicit, and only one
kind of interaction between arguments is considered, the attack relation.
Three approaches have been proposed to model support in Dung’s theory: by
Dung’s notion of defence, by instantiating abstract arguments and by adding support
relations among arguments. The following example illustrates several kinds of
interactions between arguments in an informal argument exchange during a degree
committee meeting. The related argumentation framework is visualized in Fig. 1.
– Prof1: She cannot apply for a PhD on May. (arg a)
– Stud: I will graduate on March. (arg b)
– Prof2: The student is missing a grade in the logic course. (arg c)
– Prof3: On the academic transcript there is no grade in the logic course. (arg d)
– Stud: The professor of the logic course said I passed the exam. (arg e)
The first kind of interaction is the attack relation which links for instance argument
b and argument a, while the second kind of interaction is the support relation which
links argument d and argument c. Dung’s theory of argumentation assumes that
if, e.g., in the degree committee meeting argument c defends argument a against
argument b (c → b and b → a) then c is a kind of support for a since a and c
are positively connected (c ⇒ a). Instantiating abstract arguments for representing
support means that support is seen as interaction between premises and conclusions
of the arguments. For instance, we may have argument a1 in favour of x with
{y, y → x} as premises and we find that a1 confirms the premise x of argument a2
which is in favour of k with premises {x, x → k} [24]. Concerning the addition of a
support relation between arguments, in the dialogue above we have that d provides a
new piece of information which supports argument c, but without attacking the other
arguments.
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [12] have advocated the extension of Dung’s ab-
stract framework with the support relation introducing bipolar argumentation frame-
works. Bipolarity refers to the presence of two independent kinds of interactions
between the arguments which have a diametrically opposed nature.
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13] propose to turn a bipolar argumentation
framework into a meta-argumentation framework where conflicts occur between sets
1OSCAR is an implemented architecture for rational agents, based upon a defeasible reasoner.
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Fig. 1 The argumentation
framework derived from the
informal argument exchange
during the degree committee
meeting
c ab
d
e
of arguments called coalitions, connected by support relations. They underline the
following drawback of their approach:
– the “loss of admissibility” in Dung’s sense: the introduction of coalitions of
arguments leads to the problem of having extensions where it is not true that the
arguments in the set defend themselves, i.e., the extension is admissible [15].
Moreover, Brewka and Woltran [11] underline the following drawback of Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex’s [12] bipolar theory:
– the “temporal” dimension: the support relation cannot be attacked even if a
new accepted argument shows that this relation is no more present among those
arguments.
In this paper, we underline another drawback in the approach proposed by
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [12, 13]:
– the introduction of secondary attacks: they introduce the attack c → b when a ⇒
b and c → a, but this leads to an inconsistency when argument b is supported
also by another argument d, i.e., argument b becomes unacceptable, and the
support of d is disregarded.
In Section 2, we discuss these three drawbacks in details.
In this paper, we answer the following research question:
– How to define a meta-argumentation framework in order to avoid (1) the “loss
of admissibility” in Dung’s sense, (2) the “temporal” dimension issue, and (3)
the introduction of secondary attacks, and preserving all Dung’s properties and
principles as well?
This breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to define deductive support?
2. How to define defeasible support such that also the support relation can be
attacked?
3. How to model prioritized support as strengths on the support and attack relation
such that one of the two relations prevails on the other?
4. How to use the meta-argumentation framework to represent also structured
arguments and abstract dialectical frameworks?
We define a model of support which we called deductive support. In this form of
support, when there is a support relation a ⇒ b , this means that when argument a
is accepted then argument b is accepted too and when argument b is not accepted
then argument a is not accepted either. In order to satisfy these constraints on the
166 S. Villata et al.
a cb
MEDIATED
ATTACKS
SUPPORTED
ATTACKS
a cb
Fig. 2 Supported and mediated attacks
acceptability of the arguments involved in a support relation and to avoid the
problems generated by secondary attacks, we introduce two kinds of additional
attacks, namely supported attacks and mediated attacks, visualized in Fig. 2. The
former has the form: given a ⇒ b and b → c then we add a → c, while the latter has
the form: given a ⇒ b and c → b then we add c → a. The introduction of mediated
attacks, the avoidance of secondary attacks and of coalitions of arguments allow
us to overcome two of the drawbacks mentioned above, since the former help in
preserving “admissibility in Dung’s sense” and the latter does not lead to disregarded
support relations.
We define defeasible support in order to avoid the “temporal” dimension problem
which causes the unlikely situation described above. We start from approaches
proposing second-order attacks, i.e., attacks from an argument to an attack relation.
We do the same in the context of support. The difference, introducing an attack on
the support, is represented by the fact that the constraints which hold for deductive
support, does not hold anymore.
However, it is not always desired to have the same priority for the attack or
support relation, e.g., in some modelling contexts, an agent would consider more
important the support relation while in other contexts it would consider more
relevant the attack relation. This highlights that we cannot simply provide additional
attacks which defeat the arguments involved in the support relation, as it has been
done thus far with mediated and supported attacks. We have also to consider the
fact that in some contexts the support relation is stronger than the attack relation
and thus new attacks start from the arguments involved in the support against those
arguments attacking them.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, support is a controversial notion in
argumentation theory and many interpretations of this notion have been presented in
the literature. In particular, one of the more adopted one sees the support relation as
the relation linking the premises of an argument to the conclusion of the same argu-
ment [25]. The only arguments which do not need any support are those arguments
called axioms. We represent this kind of support by using meta-argumentation. A
recent approach to the representation of support has been presented also by Brewka
and Woltran [11]. We show here how to “simulate” the acceptance conditions they
propose to represent support by using meta-argumentation.
The layout of this paper follows the research questions. Section 2 presents bipolar
argumentation frameworks as they have been firstly defined in [12] and how they
have been further improved in [13]. We highlight the drawbacks of such a way of
modeling support. Section 3 introduces our model of deductive and defeasible sup-
port, showing how the proposed meta-argumentation model of support, overcomes
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those drawbacks. Moreover, we address the issue of having different contexts where
the support relation or the attack relation are stronger and prevail over the other
relation. In Section 4 we show how our way to model support can be used to model
the support among the premises and the conclusion in structured argumentation [25]
and to model the acceptance conditions of abstract dialectical frameworks [11].
2 Bipolar argumentation frameworks: background and problems
2.1 Bipolar argumentation frameworks
An argumentation framework is a directed graph whose nodes are called arguments
and the edges represent the attack relations [15]. Arguments are abstract entities
whose role is determined only by their relation to other arguments. Their structure
and origin may not be known. We restrict ourselves to f inite argumentation frame-
works, i.e., in which the set of arguments is f inite.
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework AF [15]) An argumentation framework is
a tuple 〈A,→〉 where A is a set of elements called arguments and → is a binary
relation called attack defined on A.
A first meaning which has been assigned to the notion of support among the
arguments is the defence which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Defence [15]) Let 〈A,→〉 be an argumentation framework. Let S ⊆
A. S defends a if ∀b ∈ A such that b → a, ∃c ∈ S such that c → b .
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [12] underline the need of an explicit support
relation among the arguments to be introduced in the abstract framework and they
propose the bipolar argumentation frameworks. A bipolar argumentation frame-
work is a labeled directed graph, with two labels indicating either attack or support.
Definition 3 (Bipolar Argumentation Framework BAF [12]) A bipolar argumenta-
tion framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 consists of a finite set of element A called arguments and
two binary relations on A called attack and support, respectively.
Combining different notions of conflict, one for each kind of attack, with Dung’s
notion of acceptability, Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [12] propose various bipolar
semantics based on the notion of set-support, set-defeat and safe-set. They establish
what are the characteristic properties a set of arguments must satisfy in order to be
acceptable for a bipolar argumentation framework.
Definition 4 (Set-defeat and set-support [12]) Let S ⊆ A, let a1 ∈ A. S set-defeats
a1 if and only if there exists a supported attack or a secondary attack for a1 from
an element of S. S set-supports a1 if and only there exists a sequence of the form
A1 R1 . . . Rn−1 An, n  2, such that ∀i = 1 . . . n − 1, Ri =⇒ with An = a1 and A1 ∈ S.
168 S. Villata et al.
They investigate the extension of the concept of coherence distinguishing internal
coherence, where a set S of arguments is not accepted if it set-defeats one of its
elements, and external coherence, where a set S of arguments is not accepted if it
set-defeats and set-supports the same argument, as formalized in Definition 6.
Definition 5 (Conflict-free set [12]) Given a bipolar argumentation framework
BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉, a set C ⊆ A is conf lict free, denoted as cf(C), if and only if there
do not exist α, β ∈ C such that {α} set-defeats β.
Definition 6 (Safe set [12]) Let G ⊆ A. G is safe if and only if there does not exist
B ∈ A such that G set-defeats B and either G set-supports B, or B ∈ G.
The following definition presents the acceptability semantics of arguments pro-
vided for bipolar argumentation framework where “d” means “in the sense of Dung”,
“s” means “safe” and “c” means “closed for ⇒”. Which semantics is most appropri-
ate in which circumstances depends on the application domain of the argumentation
theory.
Definition 7 (Acceptability semantics [12]) Let BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉 be a bipolar
argumentation framework. Let S ⊆ A. S defends a if for all b ∈ A such that b → a,
there exists c ∈ S such that c → b . Let D(S) = {a | S defends a}.
– S ∈ Ed-admiss(AF) if and only if cf(S) and S ⊆ D(S).
– S ∈ Es-admiss(AF) if and only if S is safe and S ⊆ D(S).
– S ∈ Ec-admiss(AF) if and only if cf(S), closed for ⇒ and S ⊆ D(S).
– S ∈ Estable(AF) if and only if cf(S) and for all b ∈ S,S set-defeats b .
– S ∈ Ed-pref(AF) (resp. S ∈ Es-pref, S ∈ Ec-pref) if and only if S is maximal (for set-
inclusion) in Eadmiss(AF) (resp. Es-admiss(AF), Ec-admiss(AF)).
Consider the following example from [12].
Example 1 In the BAF of Fig. 3, we have that {A1, A2, H} is the only d-preferred
extension. {A1, A2} and {H} are the only two s-preferred extensions. None of them
is closed for support. The empty set is the unique c-preferred extension.
Fig. 3 Example of bipolar
argumentation framework.
Double arrows represent
support (⇒), and normal
arrows represent attack (→)
A1 BA2
H
C
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The introduction of the support relation in Dung’s framework leads to the
drawback that it is not possible to reuse the principles, algorithms, and properties
of Dung’s well-known theory. Moreover, the definitions provided by [12] are rather
complex and choosing the corresponding extensions, then computing them seems
hard. So, Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13] propose to reuse Dung’s methodology
in a “meta-argumentation” framework, where conflicts occur between coalitions of
supporting arguments. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [14] summarizes and compare
different support models in abstract argumentation, showing how they can be
reduced to the same bipolar argumentation framework.
2.2 Coalitions of arguments for handling bipolar argumentation
In this section, we summarize the main definitions of bipolar argumentation frame-
works with the terminology used by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13].
The purpose of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13] is to define a meta-argumenta-
tion framework, consisting only of a set of meta-arguments and a conflict relation
between these meta-arguments. Their idea is that a meta-argument makes sense if its
members are somehow related by the support relation.
Definition 8 (Conflict free) Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,→〉, a
set C ⊆ A is conf lict free, denoted as cf(C), iff there do not exist α, β ∈ C such that
α → β.
Meta-arguments are called elementary coalitions, and are defined as follows:
Definition 9 (Elementary coalitions [13]) An elementary coalition of BAF is a
subset EC = {a1, . . . , an} of A such that
1. there exists a permutation {i1, . . . , in} of {1, . . . , n} such that the sequence of
support ai1 ⇒ ai2 , . . . ,⇒ ain holds;
2. cf (EC);
3. EC is maximal (with respect to ⊆) among the subsets of A satisfying (1) and (2).
EC denotes the set of elementary coalitions of BAF and ECAF = 〈EC(A),
c-attacks〉 is the elementary coalition framework associated with BAF. Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex [13] define a conflict relation on EC(A) as follows:
Definition 10 (c-attacks relation [13]) Let EC1 and EC2 be two elementary coali-
tions of BAF. EC1 c-attacks EC2 if and only if there exists an argument a1 in EC1
and an argument a2 in EC2 such that a1 → a2.
Definition 11 (Acceptability semantics [13])
– S is a ecp-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a
preferred extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
– S is a ecs-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a stable
extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
– S is a ecg-extension of BAF if and only if there exists {EC1, . . . , ECp} a
grounded extension of ECAF such that S = EC1 ∪ . . . ∪ ECp.
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Definition 11 provides preferred, stable and grounded extensions, but it can
be defined more generally for any semantics defined on Dung’s argumentation
framework. In general, there is a function g that defines extensions of extended argu-
mentation frameworks in terms of extensions of meta-arguments. In Definition 11,
the extensions of arguments are obtained by taking the union of the extensions
of meta-arguments. So a BAF = 〈A,⇒,→〉 is flattened to a framework AF =
〈MA, −→〉 where MA is the set called meta arguments and −→ is a binary
relation on meta-arguments called meta-attack relation. In this way, Definition 11 be-
comes: E(BAF) = {EEC1 ∪ . . . ∪ EECp |EECi ∈ E(AF)} where E(AF) : 2U × 2U×U →
22U is Dung’s acceptance function. For example, if E(AF) = {{{a, b}, {c}}, {{d, e}}}
then E(BAF) = {{a, b , c}, {d, e}}. As we discuss in the following section, in our
meta argumentation theory we do not take the union, but we filter away auxiliary
arguments like the argument Za,b in Fig. 12.b.
Given bipolar argumentation frameworks, Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex define
supported and secondary attacks based on attack and support as shown in Fig. 4.a
and 4.b.
This figure should be read as follows. If there is a support of argument a to
argument b and there is an attack from argument b to argument c, then Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex claim that there is a supported attack from a to c. If there is an
attack from a to b and b supports c, then Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex claim that
there is a secondary attack from a to c. Supported and secondary attacks are defined
for a sequence of support relations and an attack relation in Definition 12, e.g., in
Fig. 4.a we may consider two additional arguments d, e such that d ⇒ e, e ⇒ a in
addition to a ⇒ b .
Definition 12 (Supported and secondary attacks [13]) Let a, b ∈ A, a supported
attack for b by a is a sequence a1 R1 . . . Rn−1an, n ≥ 3, with a1 = a, an = b , such
that ∀i = 1, . . . n − 2, Ri =⇒ and Rn−1 =→. A secondary attack for b by a is a
sequence a1 R1 . . . Rn−1an, n ≥ 3, with a1 = a, an = b , such that R1 =→ and ∀i =
2 . . . n − 1, Ri =⇒.
Notice that the coalitions of arguments proposed by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex
recall to mind Wigmore diagrams (WD). Wigmore [29] developed a mapping system
for legal argumentation called Wigmore diagrams. A WD is a symbolic means for
mapping arguments from observable evidence using the method of “divide and con-
quer” and multi-stage inference. The purpose of a WD is to structure arguments and
reasoning chains starting with evidence and reaching facts. Mathematically, a WD is
SUPPORTED
ATTACKS
a cb c ba
SECONDARY
ATTACKS(b)(a)
Fig. 4 The two attack relations based on attack and support defined for bipolar argumentation
frameworks [13]
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a bipartite, directed acyclic graph with labeled edges. The vertices represent propo-
sitions, and the labels represent “fuzzy” qualifiers. Rowe and Reed [26] attempt
to translate Wigmore diagrams into Araucaria structures. This attempt necessitates
some serious restrictions: all nodes supporting another node are represented as single
unlinked nodes. This is similar to what is done by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex.
Another similar approach to support has been proposed by Oren et al. [22].
The authors present how a set of arguments described using Dung’s argument
frameworks can be mapped from and to an argument framework that includes
both attack and support relations. The idea is that an argument can be accepted
only if there is an evidence supporting it, i.e., evidence is represented by means
of arguments. Again, all nodes supporting another node are represented as single
unlinked nodes.
2.3 Drawbacks of bipolar argumentation
A first drawback of the meta-argumentation approach proposed by Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex is, as they call it, the loss of admissibility in Dung’s sense. They
claim also that this loss of admissibility is neither surprising nor really problematic
for them. They motivate this claim by observing that admissibility is lost because
it takes into account “individual” attacks whereas, with their meta-argumentation,
they want to consider “collective” attacks. Although we underline that the aim of
using meta-argumentation is to preserve all Dung’s properties and principles, we
agree with Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex by observing that this drawback depends
on the application context of the framework, if the collective view is needed in the
model, this is no more a drawback. However, we do not agree that meta-arguments
make sense only if they are composed by arguments which are somehow related by a
support relation, as assumed by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex. In this paper, we show
how to prevent this drawback by using our meta-argumentation methodology and by
adding a new kind of attack called mediated attacks.
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex discuss the following example to show the drawback
of their meta-argumentation theory for bipolar argumentation, which we aim to solve
in this paper. The bipolar argumentation framework BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉 visualized
in Fig. 5 has, using their semantics, the extension (i.e., the set of acceptable argu-
ments) {d, e}, whereas {d, e} is not an admissible extension of the argumentation
Fig. 5 BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉,
with arguments
A = {a, b , c, d, e}, attack
relation {b → d, e → c}
and support relation
{a ⇒ b , b ⇒ c}
a
ec
d
b
SUPPORTED ATTACK
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framework AF = 〈A,→〉, i.e., if we do not consider the support relation and we
consider standard Dung semantics [15].
The extension {d, e} would not be admissible in Dung’s setting, because there
is no argument in the extension {d, e} attacking argument b , whereas b attacks
argument d. However, a bipolar argumentation framework extends Dung’s abstract
argumentation framework with a second binary relation ⇒ among arguments,
representing support among arguments, and in the theory of Cayrol and Lagasquie-
Schiex, this makes the extension {d, e} admissible. Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex run
into this drawback, because they turn a bipolar argumentation framework into a
“collective” meta-argumentation framework in which meta-arguments represent sets
of arguments called coalitions.
Second, the approach of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex has an additional drawback.
Suppose that Liverpool wins Premier League (argument lpl) if it wins the last
match (argument wlm) or Manchester does not win its own one (argument mnw).
We have two implications: “Liverpool wins last match” supports “Liverpool wins
Premier League”, (wlm ⇒ lpl), and “Manchester does not win last match” supports
“Liverpool wins Premier League”, (mnw ⇒ lpl), as shown in Fig. 6. If an argument a
attacks “Liverpool wins last match” (a → wlm) then it attacks also “Liverpool wins
Premier League”. This is counterintuitive because lpl is supported also by argument
mnw. This kind of attack has the form “if a ⇒ b and c → a then c → b”, and Cayrol
and Lagasquie-Schiex called it secondary attack. Oren et al. [22] do not incur into
this kind of problem, and they get the extension {a, mnw, lpl}.
Third, Brewka and Woltran [11] underline a further drawback in the bipolar
argumentation frameworks proposed by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex. Brewka and
Woltran [11] propose the following example. Assume you plan to go swimming in
the afternoon (argument s). There are clouds (argument c) indicating it might rain
(argument r). However, the (reliable) weather report says that winds (argument w)
will blow away the clouds so that there will be no rain. Now c supports r, r attacks s
and w attacks r, as shown in Fig. 7. Using Brewka and Woltran’s [11] acceptance
conditions, assuming w’s attack on r is stronger than c’s support, we get {c, w, s}
as the single well-founded, stable and preferred model which makes perfect sense.
However, this set is not conflict-free in the sense of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex. To
model the stronger notion of conflict-freeness in Brewka and Woltran’s [11] abstract
dialectical frameworks, one has to add an attack from a to c whenever c is attacked
by a node b and a, directly or indirectly, supports b . The example suggests that this
may not always be desired. As for Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, we have that also
Fig. 6 The football example
where secondary attacks lead
to inconsistencies
wlm lpl
mnw
a
secondary
attack
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Fig. 7 The Brewka and
Woltran’s example where the
stable and preferred extension
{c, w, s} is not conflict-free in
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s
theory
c
w
sr
Oren et al.’s model leads to the same problem, and the extension in their framework
with support and attack is {w, s}.
3 Bipolar argumentation in meta-argumentation
3.1 Modeling deductive support
In this section, we present how to model deductive support in meta-argumentation.
The issue of how to model support in argumentation is a controversial issue. There is
no a single notion of “support”, but it may be expected that there are many, which can
be used in different applications. However, in Dung’s framework of abstract argu-
mentation [15], support is no longer explicit and only one kind of interaction between
arguments is considered, the attack relation. Some researchers, like for instance
Prakken [25], doubt whether the support relation that holds between the premises
and the conclusion by instantiating arguments should be really distinguished from
the support relation among arguments proposed in bipolar argumentation. The aim
of this paper is not to take a position in this debate but to provide a new way to model
support in bipolar argumentation frameworks. We introduce notions as deductive
support and defeasible support which are different from Cayrol and Lagasquie-
Schiex [12, 13] and [1]. Moreover, we introduce a methodology which makes it
possible to define various kinds of support, introducing also strengths, in a relatively
easy way without the need to introduce additional machinery.
We want deductive support to satisfy the following conditions on the acceptability
of supported arguments: if argument a supports argument b , and a is acceptable,
then b must be acceptable too, and if argument a supports argument b , and b is
not acceptable, then a must be not acceptable either. Moreover, the extensions must
be admissible, if the acceptance function of the basic argumentation framework is
admissible too.
We illustrate the difference between the meta-argumentation used [13] and the
one we introduce in this paper, using an example. Consider the bipolar argumenta-
tion framework in Fig. 8.1 which visualizes the informal dialogue exchange during the
degree committee meeting. We have that argument d (“On the academic transcript
there is no grade in the logic course”) supports argument c (“The student is missing
a grade in the logic course”), argument c attacks argument b (“The student will
graduate on March”), argument b attacks argument a (“The student cannot apply
for a PhD on May”), and argument e (“The professor of the logic course said the
student passed the exam”) attacks argument c.
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d
e
bc
(1)
a d
e
bc
(2)
a
Fig. 8 The bipolar argumentation framework of the informal dialogue during the degree committee
meeting
According to Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, the extension of this bipolar argumen-
tation framework is the extension {b , e} (“The student will graduate on March” and
“The professor of the logic course said the student passed the exam”). They obtain
this extension in two steps. First, they define meta-arguments as sets of arguments,
and define meta-attack relations as attacks between sets of arguments. As illustrated
in Fig. 8.2, this means that the meta-argument {d, c} attacks argument b .
In our meta-argumentation methodology, we do not group arguments together
in meta-arguments, but we add meta-arguments. As illustrated in Fig. 9, we add
meta-arguments Xx,y and Yx,y for each attack of argument x to argument y. Meta-
argument Xx,y is read as “the attack from x to y is not active” and meta-argument
Yx,y is read as “the attack from x to y is active”. Moreover, we introduce a meta-
argument Zd,c and if argument d supports argument c, then we add the attacks
from acc(c) to Zd,c, and from Zd,c to acc(d). Meta-argument Zd,c is read as
“argument d does not support argument c”.
We [7–9, 28] instantiate Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such that we use
Dung’s theory to reason about itself. Meta-argumentation is a particular way to
define mappings from argumentation frameworks to extended argumentation frame-
works: arguments are interpreted as meta-arguments, of which some are mapped
to “argument a is accepted”, acc(a), where a is an abstract argument from the
extended argumentation framework EAF. The meta-argumentation methodology
is summarized in Fig. 10.
We use a so-called acceptance function E mapping a bipolar argumentation
framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 to its set of extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments, where
the universe of arguments U is the set of all generated arguments.
Definition 13 Let U be a set called the universe of arguments. An acceptance
function EBAF : 2U × 2U×U × 2U×U → 22U is a partial function defined for each
acc(d)
Ye,c
Xc,bacc(c)Zd,c acc(b)Yc,b
acc(e) Xe,c
Xb,a acc(a)Yb,a
Fig. 9 An example of bipolar argumentation framework in our meta-argumentation
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Fig. 10 The meta-argumentation methodology
bipolar argumentation framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 with finite A ⊆ U and →⊆ A × A and
⇒⊆ A × A, and mapping a bipolar argumentation framework 〈A,→,⇒〉 to sets of
subsets of A: EBAF(〈A,→,⇒〉) ⊆ 2A.
In the following, we read a → b as argument a attacks argument b or argument
b is attacked by argument a, and a ⇒ b as argument a supports argument b or
argument b is supported by argument a.
The function f assigns to each argument a in the EAF, an argument “argument
a is accepted” in the basic argumentation framework. We use Dung’s acceptance
function E : 2U × 2U×U → 22U to find functions E ′ between extended argumentation
frameworks EAF and the acceptable arguments AA′ they return. The accepted
arguments of the argumentation framework are a function of the extended argu-
mentation framework AA = E ′(EAF). The transformation function consists of two
parts: a function f −1 transforms an argumentation framework AF to an extended
argumentation framework EAF, and a function g transforms the acceptable ar-
guments of the basic AF into acceptable arguments of the EAF. Summariz-
ing E ′ = {( f −1(a), g(b)) | (a, b) ∈ E} and AA′ = E ′(EAF) = g(AA) = g(E(AF)) =
g(E( f (EAF))).
The first step of our approach is to define the set of extended argumentation
frameworks. The second step consists in defining flattening algorithms as a function
from this set of EAFs to the set of all basic argumentation frameworks: f : EAF →
AF. For a further discussion, see [7].
Similarly to the proposal of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13], we generalize the
key concept of attack between two arguments by combining a sequence of support
relations and a direct attack relation. If there is a support of argument a to argument
b and there is an attack from argument c to argument b , then we claim that there is
a mediated attack from c to a. Mediated attacks are illustrated in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11 The mediated attacks
a cb
MEDIATED
ATTACKS
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Mediated attacks are defined as follows:
Definition 14 (Mediated attacks) Let a, b , c ∈ A, a mediated attack on b by a is
a sequence a1 R1 . . . Rn−2an−1 and an Rn−1an−1, n ≥ 3, with a1 = a, an−1 = b , an = c,
such that Rn−1 =→ and ∀i = 1 . . . n − 2, Ri =⇒.
We have that argument a = a1, argument b = an−1, and argument c = an. The
figure must be read as follows: a dashed arrow is an additional attack, in this case
called mediated attack, due to the presence of a support and an attack against one
of the arguments involved in the support relation. In Fig. 11, argument a supports
argument b , and argument c attacks argument b . Mediated attacks establish that
every time there is a situation like the one in Fig. 11, then an additional attack
is added and argument c attacks also argument a such as the supporting argument
of b . Mediated attacks and supported attacks are the core of our representation of
deductive support.
Summarizing, our approach also uses meta-argumentation and therefore also
reuses Dung’s principles, algorithms and properties [7, 8]. However, we represent
the deductive support of argument a to argument b by means of the attack of
argument b to an auxiliary argument called Za,b , together with the attack of
argument Za,b to argument a. Instead of secondary attacks, we introduce mediated
attacks representing the following constraint: if a ⇒ b and c → b then a mediated
attack c → a is added. As visualized in Fig. 12, the set of acceptable arguments
{d, e} is admissible because given that b → d, e defends d against b with a mediated
attack e  b and {d, e} is stable because a /∈ {d, e} and argument e ∈ {d, e} attacks
a with the mediated attack e  a, due to the mediated attack e  b , where 
are supported and mediated attacks. So the set of acceptable arguments {d, e} is
admissible in Dung’s sense in our model thanks to these mediated attacks and the
absence of “collective” meta-arguments.
Example 2 Let BAF1 be defined by arguments A = {a, b , c, d, e}, support relation
{d ⇒ c} and attack relation {b → a, c → b , e → c}, as shown in Fig. 13. BAF1
has one supported attack, because given d ⇒ c and c → b we add d  b and
one mediated attack, because given d ⇒ c and e → c we add e  d. The set of
acceptable arguments is {e, b} and this is the only preferred, grounded and stable
extension.
Example 3 Let BAF2 be defined by arguments A = {a, b , c, d, e}, support relation
{c ⇒ b , c ⇒ d} and attack relation {a → b , d → e}, as shown in Fig. 14. We have
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b
Xb,d acc(d)Yb,d
Zb,c acc(c) acc(e)Xe,cYe,c
a
ec
d
b
MEDIATED ATTACK
MEDIATED ATTACK
SUPPORTED ATTACK
(b)(a)
Fig. 12 a BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉, with arguments A = {a, b , c, d, e}, attack relation {b → d, e → c} and
support relation {a ⇒ b , b ⇒ c}. b The BAF in our meta-argumentation framework
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Fig. 13 BAF1 with the
supported and mediated
attacks
c ab
d
e
two new attacks: a  c is a mediated attack and c  e is a supported attack. So
there is only one preferred extension which is also stable and grounded {a, d}, as
for the associate Dung’s AF, while the preferred, grounded and stable extensions
of [13] for BAF2 is {a, e}. This is because, first, the mediated attack a  c is not
considered, they claim there is no attack of an element of the set {a, e} against c.
Introducing explicitly mediated attacks allows us to preserve admissibility in Dung’s
sense. Second, in [13], arguments b , c, d are considered as a unique meta-argument
thus acceptable only as a whole.
Definition 15 presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation framework as
a bipolar argumentation framework using meta-argumentation. This allows us to
have not only that arguments can support other arguments, but also that arguments
can support attacks and that attacks can support other attacks. In this way, we do
not restrict the support relation of being only between arguments but also between
binary relations themselves. In the modelling perspective we adopt in this paper, we
treat arguments and attacks as entities which can be related to each other by support
in the same way.
The flattening of the support relations can be summarized in the following way.
Given a support relation a ⇒ b , it holds that if argument b is not acceptable then
argument a is not acceptable either and if argument a is acceptable then argument
b is acceptable too. The universe of meta-arguments is MU = {acc(a) | a ∈ U} ∪
{Xa,b , Ya,b | a, b ∈ U} ∪ {Za,b | a, b ∈ U}, and the flattening function f is given by
f (EAF) = 〈MA, −→〉 where MA is the set called meta-arguments and −→ is a
binary relation called meta-attack. For a set of arguments B ⊆ MU , the unflattening
function g is given by g(B) = {a | acc(a) ∈ B}, and for sets of arguments AA ⊆ 2MU ,
it is given by g(AA) = {g(B) | B ∈ AA}.
Definition 15 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF = 〈A,→,⇒〉, the
set of meta-arguments MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b , Ya,b | a → b ∈→} ∪
{Za,b | a ⇒ b ∈⇒} and −→⊆ MA × MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
a edcb
Fig. 14 BAF2 with the supported and mediated attacks
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acc(a) −→ Xa,b iff a → b and Xa,b −→ Ya,b iff a → b and Ya,b −→ acc(b) iff a →
b , acc(b) −→ Za,b iff a ⇒ b and Za,b −→ acc(a) iff a ⇒ b .
Meta-argument Y represents the fact that the attack is active, thus if it is accepted,
then the argument attacked by means of this attack is not accepted. Meta-argument
X, instead, represents the fact that the attack is inactive, and meta-argument Z
represent the support relation. If it is not accepted, then the supported argument
is accepted in our deductive model of support.
For a given flattening function f , the acceptance function of the extended argu-
mentation theory E ′ is defined using the acceptance function of the basic abstract
argumentation theory E : an argument of an EAF is acceptable if and only if it is
acceptable in the flattened basic AF.
The following propositions hold for our meta-argumentation with supported and
mediated attacks.
Proposition 1 (Semantics of support) Given a bipolar argumentation framework
BAF and an admissible extension E ∈ E(BAF), if it holds that a ⇒ b and argument
a is acceptable, a ∈ E, then argument b is acceptable too, b ∈ E.
Proof We prove the contrapositive. If it holds that a ⇒ b and argument b is not ac-
ceptable, then argument a is not acceptable. Assume that a ⇒ b and meta-argument
acc(b) is not accepted, then meta-argument Za,b is acceptable. Consequently, meta-
argument acc(a) is not acceptable. unionsq
Note that Proposition 1 can be proved also using a forward proof: if a supports
b , and a ∈ E, then b ∈ E. The fact that a supports b means that acc(b) attacks Za,b
and Za,b attacks acc(a). We have that acc(a) is acceptable, then Za,b is rejected and
acc(b) is acceptable. Thus argument b is acceptable.
Proposition 2 (Conflict free for supported and mediated attacks) Given a bipolar
argumentation framework BAF and an admissible extension E ∈ E(BAF), if there is
a supported or mediated attack from a to b, and a is acceptable, a ∈ E, then b is not
acceptable, b ∈ E.
Proof We prove the contrapositive. If there is a supported or mediated attack from a
to b , and b is acceptable, then a is not acceptable. So assume that there is a supported
or mediated attack from a to b , and acc(b) is acceptable. Then meta-argument Ya,b
is not acceptable and Xa,b is acceptable. Consequently, acc(a) is not acceptable. unionsq
Note that Proposition 2 can be proved also using a forward proof: if there is a
supported or mediated attack from a to b , and a ∈ E, then b ∈ E. These two cases are
visualized in Fig. 15. We first consider a supported attack from a to b . This means that
there is at least an argument c such that a supports c, and c attacks b . We have that
acc(c) attacks Za,c, Za,c attacks acc(a), acc(c) attacks Xc,b , Xc,b attacks Yc,b , and Yc,b
attacks acc(b). We assume acc(a) is acceptable, then Za,c is not acceptable, acc(c) is
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acc(a) acc(c)Za,c Xc,b acc(b)Yc,b
acc(b) acc(c)Zb,c Yc,a acc(a)Xc,ab ac
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ATTACKS
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a bc
Fig. 15 Mediated and supported attacks, and the related flattened frameworks
acceptable, Xc,b is not acceptable, Yc,b is acceptable and acc(b) is not acceptable.
Thus, argument b is not acceptable. We consider now a mediated attack from a to b .
This means that there is at least an argument c such that b supports c, and a attacks
c. We have that acc(c) attacks Zb ,c, Zb ,c attacks acc(b), acc(a) attacks Xa,c, Xa,c
attacks Ya,c, and Ya,c attacks acc(c). We assume acc(a) is acceptable, then Xa,c is not
acceptable, Ya,c is acceptable, acc(c) is not acceptable, Zb ,c is acceptable, and acc(b)
is not acceptable. Thus, argument b is not acceptable.
Proposition 3 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF, if we add a supported
attack such that a → c if a ⇒ b and b → c, then the extensions do not change, using
our meta-argumentation and one of Dung’s semantics.
Proof We use reasoning by cases. Case 1: acc(a) is acceptable, then also acc(b)
is acceptable, follows from Proposition 1, and given b → c, a → c can be deleted
without changing the extension. Case 2: acc(a) is not acceptable, then the attack
a → c can be deleted. unionsq
Proposition 4 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF, if we add a mediated
attack such that c → a if a ⇒ b and c → b, then the extensions do not change, using
our meta-argumentation and one of Dung’s semantics.
Proof We use reasoning by cases. Case 1: acc(c) is acceptable, then acc(a) is not
acceptable, follows from Proposition 1, and given c → b , c → a can be deleted
without changing the extension. Case 2: acc(c) is not acceptable, then acc(a) is
acceptable, and the attack c → a can be deleted. unionsq
Notice that in this paper we consider only two valued semantics. We would need
a three valued semantics to reason about the values of supported and attacked
arguments in terms of parents or children. The extension of our model of deductive
support to a three valued semantics is left as future work. It may be argued that
our representation of deductive support is in contrast with other interpretations of
support. Specifically, the fact that a supports b is modeled by the flattening function
with a path from acc(b) to acc(a), i.e., acc(a) is acceptable only if acc(b) is acceptable.
It does not correspond to the other view of support from a to b , i.e., the acceptance
of b yields the acceptance of a and not vice versa.
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acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Xb,c acc(c)Yb,c
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Yc,b acc(c)Xc,b
(1)
(2)
a b c
a b c
Fig. 16 Turning BAF3 and BAF4 into meta-argumentation
Note that, given a ⇒ b , in meta-argumentation we condense all the attacks which
are both on b and thus on a (both from b and thus from a) using only meta-argument
Za,b . This means that the closure rules do not change the extensions of the meta-
argumentation framework. In this way we simplify the representation of the meta-
argumentation framework in which supported and mediated attacks occur.
Example 4 Let BAF3 be defined by A={a, b , c}, {a ⇒ b}, {b → c} and BAF4 be
defined by A={a, b , c}, {a ⇒ b}, {c → b}. The instantiation of a classical argumen-
tation framework as BAF3 and BAF4 is depicted in Fig. 16. The sets of meta-
arguments are MA3 ={acc(a), acc(b), acc(c), Xb ,c, Yb ,c, Za,b } and MA4 = {acc(a),
acc(b), acc(c), Xc,b , Yc,b , Za,b }. In BAF3, we have that the set of meta-attack re-
lations is composed by acc(b) −→ Xb ,c −→ Yb ,c −→ acc(c) and by the support
relation acc(b) −→ Za,b −→ acc(a). The same happens for BAF4 where we have
acc(c) −→ Xc,b −→ Yc,b −→ acc(b) and the support relation acc(b) −→ Za,b −→
acc(a). The set of acceptable arguments for each BAF is represented by the grey ar-
guments. We have that E ′(BAF3) = {a, b} and E ′(BAF4) = {c} are the acceptable ar-
guments. The sets of acceptable arguments for the meta-argumentation frameworks
are E( f (BAF3)) = {acc(a), acc(b), Yb ,c} and E( f (BAF4)) = {acc(c), Za,b , Yc,b },
and by filtering these sets we obtain the same acceptable arguments of the starting
BAFs, E ′(BAF3) = g(E( f (BAF3))) = {a, b} and E ′(BAF4) = g(E( f (BAF4))) =
{c}. Meta-argument Za,b represents in a compact way that every attack from b to
an argument c leads to an attack from a to c (BAF3) and that every attack to b from
an argument c leads to an attack from c to a (BAF4).
Example 5 Let BAF5 be defined by A={a, b , c, d}, {a ⇒ b , b ⇒ c, a ⇒ d}, {d → c}
as in Fig. 17. The set of acceptable arguments is {d} as for the associated Dung’s
argumentation framework. In bipolar argumentation [13], the set of acceptable
arguments is {a, b , d}, or {a, d} if elementary coalitions are considered.
acc(a)
Zb,cacc(b)Za,b
acc(c)
Za,d acc(d) Yd,cXd,c
a
cd
b
Fig. 17 Turning BAF5 into meta-argumentation
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Our approach allows us to reuse all the principles, algorithms and properties
defined for standard Dung’s argumentation framework without loosing admissibility
in Dung’s sense. Using our meta-argumentation admissibility in Dung’s sense is
not lost because we take into account individual attacks and defence while Cayrol
and Lagasquie-Schiex [13] consider “collective” attacks and defence for coalitions.
The second drawback of the approach presented in [13] is, as described by the
football example in Section 2, that secondary attacks lead to inconsistencies, i.e., if
the argument “Liverpool wins last match” is attacked then this does not mean that
argument “Liverpool wins Premier League” is attacked too since it is supported also
by another argument, “Manchester does not win last match”. In our approach, we
avoid the introduction of the so called secondary attacks.
3.2 Modeling defeasible support
In this section, we define defeasible support such as we define how to model attacks
towards the support relation, similarly to what has been proposed for the attack
relation [5, 6, 19]. Let us consider again the degree committee meeting dialogue
where we add:
– Stud: I was in the hospital in the date of the logic exam. (arg f)
– Prof1: There is no record of your stay in the hospital. (arg g)
– Stud: The professor of logic was ill and cannot register my exam. (arg h)
We have that argument f attacks the attack from c to b . This attack would put
argument b as acceptable but the addition of argument g attacking f leaves b as
not acceptable. Argument h, instead, raises another kind of attack, an attack on
the support relation. The attack of argument h to the support d ⇒ c has numerous
consequences on the argumentation framework since the supported and mediated
attacks have to be deleted and arguments d and c become unrelated to each other.
The argumentation framework is visualized in Fig. 18.
Fig. 18 The BAF of the
discussion during the degree
committee meeting with
new arguments
c ab
d
e
f
g
h
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We highlight two possible kinds of second-order attacks and we present how
to instantiate Dung’s argumentation framework with an extended argumentation
framework with support relations and these second-order attack relations. The two
kinds of second-order attacks are, first, attacks from an argument or an attack
relation to another attack relation and second, attacks from an argument to a support
relation. The first kind of second-order attack has received a lot of attention in
the last years and similar proposals using a meta approach have been proposed
[3–6, 17, 20, 21]. The difference is that we are able to treat also the case in which
an attack relation attacks another attack relation. Concerning the second kind
of second-order attacks, it has not been considered yet in the context of bipolar
argumentation frameworks.
Definition 16 presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation framework
as a bipolar second-order argumentation framework using meta-argumentation.
The flattening function f is as in Definition 15, and the first two constraints of
Definition 15 are repeated here for clarity reasons.
Definition 16 Given an extended argumentation framework EAF =〈A,→,⇒,→2〉
where A ⊆ U is a set of arguments, →⊆ A × A, ⇒⊆ A × A and →2⊆ (A∪ →) ×
(→ ∪ ⇒), the set of meta-arguments MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b , Ya,b |
a → b ∈→} ∪ {Za,b | a ⇒ b ∈⇒}∪ {Xa,b→c, Ya,b→c | a, b , c ∈ A}∪{Xa,b⇒c, Ya,b⇒c |
a, b , c ∈ A} and −→⊆ MA × MA is a binary relation on MA such that:
acc(a) −→ Xa,b iff a → b and Xa,b −→ Ya,b iff a → b and Ya,b −→ acc(b) iff a → b ,
acc(b) −→ Za,b iff a ⇒ b and Za,b −→ acc(a) iff a ⇒ b ,
acc(a) −→ Xa,b→c iff a →2 (b → c) and Xa,b→c −→ Ya,b→c iff a →2 (b → c)
and Ya,b→c −→ Yb ,c iff a →2 (b → c),
Ya,b −→ Yc,d iff (a → b) →2 (c → d),
acc(c) −→ Xc,a⇒b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b) and Xc,a⇒b −→ Yc,a⇒b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b)
and Yc,a⇒b −→ Za,b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b).
We use the notation a →2 (b → c) to express the fact that argument a attacks
the attack from argument b to argument c, and c →2 (a ⇒ b) to express the fact
that argument c attacks the support from argument a to argument b . Note that the
notation a ⇒ b is equivalent to the notation Za,b (i.e., meta-argument Za,b represent
the support a ⇒ b in the meta-level), and the notation a → b is equivalent to the
notation Ya,b (i.e., meta-argument Ya,b represent the attack a → b in the meta-level.
The following propositions hold for our meta-argumentation with defeasible
support.
Proposition 5 (Semantics of defeasible support) Given a bipolar argumentation
framework BAF and an admissible extension E ∈ E(BAF), it does not hold that
if a ⇒ b, d →2 (a ⇒ b) argument a is acceptable and there exists an argument e
attacking argument b, then argument b is acceptable too, b ∈ E.
Proof Argument a supports argument b means that acc(b) attacks Za,b and Za,b
attacks acc(a). We have that acc(a) is acceptable, then Za,b is not acceptable. The fact
that argument d attacks the support of a to b means that acc(d) attacks Za,b . Thus
Za,b is not acceptable. We assume argument e attacks argument b . Then acc(e) is
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acceptable, Xe,b is not acceptable and Ye,b is acceptable, and acc(b) is not acceptable.
Thus argument a is acceptable and argument b is not acceptable. unionsq
Only part of Proposition 2 holds also with the presence of an attack on the support
relation, as shown by Propositions 6 and 7. In particular, Proposition 2 does not hold
in the case of mediated attacks.
Proposition 6 (Conflict free for supported attacks) Given a bipolar argumentation
framework BAF and an admissible extension E ∈ E(BAF), it holds that if a ⇒ c,
d →2 (a ⇒ c) and there is a supported attack from a to b, and a is acceptable, a ∈ E,
then b is not acceptable, b ∈ E.
Proof The support a ⇒ c means that acc(c) attacks Za,c, Za,c attacks acc(a), and
d →2 (a ⇒ c) means that acc(d) attacks Za,c. If there is a supported attack from a
to b , this means that c attacks b . Then acc(c) attacks Xc,b , Xc,b attacks Yc,b , and
Yc,b attacks acc(b). Assume acc(a) is acceptable, then Za,c is not acceptable, acc(c)
is acceptable, Xc,b is not acceptable, Yc,b is acceptable and acc(b) is not acceptable.
acc(d) attacks Za,c too, but it is already made not acceptable by the attack of acc(a),
which is assumed to be acceptable. Thus, argument b is not acceptable. unionsq
Proposition 7 (Conflict free for mediated attacks) Given a bipolar argumentation
framework BAF and an admissible extension E ∈ E(BAF), it does not hold that if
b ⇒ c, d →2 (b ⇒ c) and there is a mediated attack from a to b, and a is acceptable,
a ∈ E, then b is not acceptable, b ∈ E.
Proof The support b ⇒ c means that acc(c) attacks Zb ,c, Zb ,c attacks acc(b), and
d →2 (b ⇒ c) means that acc(d) attacks Zb ,c. Thus, Zb ,c is not acceptable. acc(a)
attacks Xa,c, Xa,c attacks Ya,c, and Ya,c attacks acc(c). We assume acc(a) is acceptable,
then Xa,c is not acceptable, Ya,c is acceptable, acc(c) is not acceptable. Zb ,c is not
acceptable because of the secondary attack from acc(d), thus acc(b) is acceptable.
Thus, argument b is acceptable. unionsq
Proposition 8 Given a bipolar argumentation framework BAF, it does not hold that if
we add a mediated attack such that c → a if a ⇒ b, d →2 (a ⇒ b) and c → b, then the
extensions do not change, using our meta-argumentation and one of Dung’s semantics.
Proof We use reasoning by cases. Case 1: acc(c) is acceptable, then since acc(d)
attacks Za,b then Za,b is not acceptable, and thus acc(a) is acceptable, and given
c → b , the mediated attack c → a cannot be deleted without changing the extension.
Case 2: acc(c) is not acceptable, then acc(a) is acceptable, and the attack c → a can
be deleted. unionsq
Example 6 Let BAF3 be extended with the second-order attack relation {d→(b →c)},
as in Fig. 19.1. The set of acceptable arguments is {a, b , c, d} since the attack from b
to c is made ineffective by argument d. Let BAF4 be extended with the second-order
attack relation {d → (c → b))}, as in Fig. 19.2. The set of acceptable arguments is
again {a, b , c, d}. Note that since b is no more attacked and can be accepted, also a
can be accepted in this example.
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Fig. 19 BAF3 and BAF4 with second-order attacks
What does it mean that the support relation between two arguments does not hold
anymore? It means that, given a ⇒ b , when b is not acceptable, a can be acceptable
and converse when a is acceptable than b can be rejected.
Example 7 Let BAF3 be extended with the second-order attack relation {d→(a⇒b))},
as in Fig. 20.1. The set of acceptable arguments is {a, b , d}. Let BAF4 be extended
with the second-order attack relation {d → (a ⇒ b))}, as in Fig. 20.2. The set of
acceptable arguments is {a, c, d}. Note that b is attacked by argument c and it is not
acceptable but a is acceptable because the support relation has been made ineffective
by the attack of d.
We can now address the third drawback presented in Section 2. As highlighted by
the example proposed by Brewka and Woltran [11], we have that, in the framework
of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13], given a ⇒ b and c → b , we get that argument
c and argument a cannot be in the same stable or preferred extension because the set
would not be conflict-free. In the case of [13], this is due to the fact that a and b form a
“collective” argument which is attacked as a whole. In our case, this is due to the fact
that there would be the activation of a mediated attack from c to a. But what does it
mean that “the weather report says that winds will blow away the clouds so that there
will be no rain”? In our view, this means that the support relation among argument
c and argument r does not hold any more. We model this with defeasible support.
c has a temporal dimension which is disregarded by Brewka and Woltran [11] and
which is considered in deductive support. Thus we do not run into the drawback
highlighted by [11]. Let us consider the following example: the fact that Tweety is a
bird (tb) provides support for its flying ability (t f ). Then it turns out that Tweety is a
acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Xb,c acc(c)Yb,c acc(a) acc(b)Za,b Yc,b acc(c)Xc,b
Yd, Za,b acc(d)Xd, Za,b Yd, Za,b acc(d)Xd, Za,b
(1) (2)
a
d
cb a
d
cb
Fig. 20 BAF3 and BAF4 with an attack on the support relation
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Fig. 21 The two BAF
representing (a) the weather
example, and (b) the Tweety
example
c
w
sr tb
tp
tf
(b)(a)
pinguin (tp). Argument “Tweety flies” is attacked by “Tweety is a pinguin”, tp → t f .
Following our constraints, does it mean that Tweety is not a bird? No, we have that
argument tp attacks both the argument t f but also the fact that being a bird supports
the flying ability of Tweety, tp → (tb ⇒ t f ). These two examples are visualized in
Fig. 21.
Table 1 summarizes the comparison between Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s [13]
approach and our one.
3.3 Modeling prioritized support
In this section, we specify further kinds of attacks due to the priorities which can be
associated to the attack and the support relations in different contexts. Thus far, we
consider only the case in which attack is stronger than support, →arg⇒, as shown
in Fig. 11. This is represented by mediated attacks where the attack of argument
c is stronger than the support among a and b and it leads to an additional attack
from c to a. The notation →arg⇒ means that the attack relation is stronger than
support and this leads to an additional attack on the argument involved in the support
relation, arg.
In the modelling perspective adopted in this paper, this is not the only case which
has to be considered. There are three additional patterns we have to take into
account:
– on-sup attacks: given that a ⇒ b and c → b , we have that the attack relation is
stronger than the support relation →rel⇒. This leads to the additional second-
order attack c  (a ⇒ b) called on-sup attack. This case is a particular instance
of defeasible support. The origin of this pattern can be found in structured
argumentation: you cannot attack an argument’s conclusion without attacking
also the support relation given by the premises to the conclusion. This pattern
is visualized in Fig. 22.a.
– on-arg attacks: given that a ⇒ b and c → b , we have that the support relation
is stronger than the attack relation ⇒arg→. This leads to the additional attack
a  c called on-arg attack. The additional attack is addressed against argument
c. This pattern is visualized in Fig. 22.b.
Table 1 Comparison between Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13] and our approach
Their meta-argumentation Our meta-argumentation
Additional attacks Supported, secondary Supported, mediated
Meta-arguments Sets of arguments Additional meta-arguments
Function g Union of meta-arguments Filtering meta-arguments
Admissibility in Dung’s sense No Yes
Attacks on support relation No Yes
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ON-ARG
ATTACKS
a cb
(b) ON-ATATTACKS
a cb
(c)ON-SUPATTACKS
a cb
(a)
Fig. 22 Patterns of attacks and supports with priorities
– on-att attacks: given that a ⇒ b and c → b , we have that the support rela-
tion is stronger that the attack relation ⇒rel→. This leads to an additional
second-order attack a  (c → b) called on-att attack. The additional attack is
addressed against the attack c → b . This pattern is visualized in Fig. 22.c.
We provide these additional ways to treat the relationship between support and
attack in a modeling view of argumentation. Suppose we use argumentation theory
to model the relationships among the different requirements of a system, as done
for example by Bagheri and Ensan [2], in the early requirements definition phase.
The engineer using our modeling methodology will be able to model not only the
priority of the support among the requirements over the inconsistencies among the
requirements, i.e., attacks, but he can define also which kind of priority he wants to
assign. Thus, depending on the aim and the preferences of the engineer, he can give
an higher priority to the inconsistencies among the different requirements proposed
by the stakeholders, such that this priority is translated into an attack against the
support among the requirements, and not directly against the requirement itself,
since it is not directly attackable.
Definition 17 presents the instantiation of a basic argumentation framework
as a bipolar second-order argumentation framework with strengths using meta-
argumentation. We introduce for each argument a an additional meta-argument a′
which will attack the relation or the argument depending on the strengths of attack
and support. The flattening of the four cases is visualized in Fig. 23.
First, if the attack relation c → b is stronger than the support relation a ⇒ b ,
(c → b) a⇒b (a ⇒ b), and this leads to the attack to the support a ⇒ b , a⇒b , then
we add an attack relation from meta-argument c′ to the meta-argument representing
the support, Za,b . This means that argument a is accepted even if argument b is not
accepted. The attack relation is stronger than the support relation, and thus the latter
is disconnected. This case is visualized in Fig. 23.a. Mediated attacks have already
been discussed in the previous section and they are visualized in Fig. 23.b.
Second, if the support relation a ⇒ b is stronger than the attack relation c → b ,
(a ⇒ b) c (c → b), and if this leads to an attack to the argument c, c, then we add
an attack relation from meta-argument a′ to the meta-argument acc(c). This means
that the support relation is stronger than the attack relation and it “defends” the
supported argument b by means of the supporting argument a. This case is visualized
in Fig. 23.c.
Third, if the support relation a ⇒ b is stronger than the attack relation c → b ,
(a ⇒ b) c→b (c → b), and if it leads to an attack to the attack relation c → b , c→b ,
then we add an attack relation from meta-argument a′ to meta-argument Yc,b such
as the meta-argument representing the attack relation from c to b . This means that
the support relation, being stronger than the attack relation, “defends” argument b
by deactivating the attack relation against it. This case is visualized in Fig. 23.d.
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ATTACKS
a cb
(c)
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ATTACKS
a cb
(d)
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a cb
(a)
MEDIATED
ATTACKS
a cb
(b)
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
c'Yc',Za,b Xc',Za,b
Xc,b
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)Xc,b
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
a' Ya',cXa',c
Xc,b
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
a' Ya',Yc,bXa',Yc,b
Xc,b
Fig. 23 Flattening of the patterns of attack and support with strengths
The flattening function f is as in Definition 15.
Definition 17 Given an extended argumentation framework EAF = 〈A,→,⇒,
→2,〉 where A⊆U is a set of arguments, →⊆ A× A, ⇒⊆ A× A, →2⊆ (A∪ →) ×
(→ ∪ ⇒), and  is a partial order representing the strength associated to the attack
and support relations, the set of meta-arguments MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a), a′ | a ∈ A} ∪
{Xa,b , Ya,b | a → b ∈ →} ∪ {Za,b | a ⇒ b ∈ ⇒} ∪ {Xa,b→c, Ya,b→c | a, b , c ∈ A} ∪
{Xa,b⇒c, Ya,b⇒c | a, b , c ∈ A} and −→⊆ MA × MA is a binary relation on MA such
that:
acc(a) −→ Xa,b iff a→b and Xa,b −→Ya,b iff a→b and Ya,b −→ acc(b) iff a → b ,
acc(a) −→ Xa,b ′ iff a → b and Xa,b ′ −→ Ya,b ′ iff a → b and Ya,b ′ −→ b ′ iff a → b ,
acc(b) −→ Za,b iff a ⇒ b and Za,b −→ acc(a) iff a ⇒ b ,
acc(a) −→ Xa,b→c iff a →2 (b → c) and Xa,b→c −→ Ya,b→c iff a →2 (b → c)
and Ya,b→c −→ Yb ,c iff a →2 (b → c),
Ya,b −→ Yc,d iff (a → b) →2 (c → d),
acc(c) −→ Xc,a⇒b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b) and Xc,a⇒b −→ Yc,a⇒b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b)
and Yc,a⇒b −→ Za,b iff c →2 (a ⇒ b)
a′ −→ Xa′,c iff (a ⇒ b) c (c → b) and Xa′,c −→ Ya′,c iff (a ⇒ b) c (c → b)
and Ya′,c −→ acc(c) iff (a ⇒ b) c (c → b)
a′ −→Xa′,c→b iff (a⇒b)c→b (c→b) and Xa′,c→b −→Ya′,c→b iff (a⇒b)c→b (c→b)
and Ya′,c→b −→ Yc,b iff (a ⇒ b) c→b (c → b)
c′ −→Xc′,a⇒b iff (c→b)a⇒b (a⇒b) and Xc′,a⇒b −→Yc′,a⇒b iff (c→b)a⇒b (a⇒b)
and Yc′,a⇒b −→ Za,b iff (c → b) a⇒b (a ⇒ b)
Example 8 Let BAF6 be defined by A = {a, b , c, d}, {a ⇒ b}, {c → b , d → a}, and
it holds that (a ⇒ b) c (c → b), as visualized in Fig. 24.a. The set of acceptable
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a cb
(a)
a cb
(b)
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
a' Ya',cXa',c
Xc,b
acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
a' Ya',Yc,bXa',Yc,b
Xc,b
d
d
acc(d)
acc(d)
Fig. 24 Bipolar argumentation frameworks described in Example 8
arguments of BAF6 is {d, c}. Note that the acceptability of argument b is not affected
by the attack of argument d to argument a but it is affected by the attack of argument
c. The attack of d against a leads to the deactivation of the “defence” provided
by argument a to argument b concerning the attack of c. Let BAF7 be defined by
A = {a, b , c, d}, {a ⇒ b}, {c → b , d → a}, and it holds that (a ⇒ b) c→b (c → b),
as visualized in Fig. 24.b. The set of acceptable arguments of BAF7 is again {d, c}.
The difference with BAF6 is that argument c would be acceptable independently
from the attack of d to a, because the “defence” of a to b is addressed against the
attack relation and not directly against argument c.
Example 9 Let BAF7 be defined by A = {a, b , c, d, e, f }, {a ⇒ b , a ⇒ e}, {c →
b , f → e, d → a}, and it holds that (a ⇒ b) c (c → b) and ( f → e) a (a ⇒ e),
as visualized in Fig. 25. Argument a supports two different arguments b and e,
respectively. These two arguments are attacked. In the first case, we have that
the support relation is stronger than the attack relation. Thus, argument a defends
argument b by attacking argument c by means of an on-arg attack. In the second
case, we have that the attack relation f → e is stronger than the support provided
by argument a to argument e. Thus, a mediated attack from f to a is addressed.
Argument d attacks argument a, thus, in the flattened framework, it attacks also
meta-argument a′. The set of acceptable arguments of BAF7 is {d, f, c}. Notice that
when an argument, in this case argument a, supports two other arguments and only in
one case the support is stronger than the attack, then the argument is not acceptable.
If we do not consider argument d, we have that the set of acceptable arguments
a cb acc(a) Za,b acc(b) Yc,b acc(c)
a' Ya',cXa',c
Xc,b
d
acc(d)
e f Za,e acc(e) Yf,e acc(f)Xf,e
Fig. 25 The bipolar argumentation framework described in Example 9
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becomes {b , f }. This is because meta-argument a′ maintains the fact that the support
a ⇒ b is stronger than c → b , independently from the strengths regarding the other
attack relations. Meta-argument a′ is attacked only by those arguments which directly
attack argument a and not by the additional attacks added in order to establish the
strengths. Here, argument a is also attacked by argument d which attacks directly
meta-argument a′.
4 Applications
In this section, we propose some applications of our meta-argumentation modelling
of support to two recent approaches: structured argumentation and Brewka and
Woltran’s [11] abstract dialectical frameworks.
4.1 Structured argumentation
In structured argumentation [25], an argument cannot be accepted if there are no
premises supporting the conclusion. We can see in abstract argumentation the sup-
port relation as a relation only among the arguments which represent the premises
and the argument which represents the conclusion where a ⇒ b means that the
premise a supports the conclusion b . Using the methodology of meta-argumentation,
we model this kind of support relation by means of two meta-arguments ¬a and a′.
We have that argument b is attacked by a meta-argument ¬b . This means that every
argument in principle is not acceptable. Then, if argument b is supported by another
argument a, this argument will attack by means of meta-argument a′ meta-argument
¬b leading to the acceptance of b . Only those arguments which are called axioms
does not need to be supported by the other arguments since they are not attacked by
the ¬q meta-arguments.
Example 10 Consider the example visualized in Fig. 26. We represent the support
relation among a and b as we presented in Section 3. Moreover, in order to assess
that argument b can be accepted only if it is supported by one or more other
arguments, we introduce a new meta-argument ¬b attacking b which is attacked only
if argument b is supported. The same happens to argument c which is attacked by
meta-argument ¬c. The set of acceptable arguments in this example is {a, b}. Notice
that a is not attacked by meta-argument ¬a because it is assumed to be an axiom, as
shown by the double border of the argument in Fig. 26. Otherwise, we could have
that both arguments a and b would be not accepted.
a cb cxybz
¬ba'
a
¬c
Fig. 26 An example of support in structured argumentation using meta-argumentation
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ae b e bz
¬ba'
a
¬a
z
e'
Fig. 27 An example of support of two arguments in structured argumentation
Example 11 Consider the example visualized in Fig. 27. We have argument e sup-
porting argument a and argument a supporting argument b . Argument e is an
axiom thus it does not need the support of any other argument while argument a
needs the support of argument e and the same holds for argument b . Argument e
supports argument a by attacking the ¬a meta-argument and this leads also to the
acceptance of argument b . Argument a attacks by means of meta-argument a′ the
meta-argument ¬b attacking b . The set of accepted arguments is {a, b , e}.
Note that we propose, in this section, a way to unify the view of support we
presented in Section 3 and the view of support in structured argumentation. Thus, we
maintain our deductive support but, in this case, it is dependent on the fact that every
argument has to be supported for being accepted. Moreover, our idea of introducing
evidence in support of the arguments is similar to what is proposed by [22]. The
difference is that we do not introduce meta-argument ν as supporting argument
of every chain of supporting arguments and we do not see the sets of supporting
arguments as a unique meta-argument.
4.2 Abstract dialectical framework
In this section, we show how to apply the models presented in this paper for deductive
and defeasible support to the abstract dialectical frameworks of Brewka and Woltran
[11] and we compare them. They claim to introduce a generalization of Dung-style
argumentation where each node comes with an associated acceptance condition.This
allows to model different types of dependencies, e.g. support and attack, within
a single framework. Abstract dialectical frameworks are defined as a tuple D =
(S, L, C) where S is a set of nodes, L ⊆ S × S is a set of links, and C is an acceptance
condition associated to each node. Cs specifies the exact conditions under which
argument s is accepted. Summarizing, if for some R ⊆ par(s), where par(s) are the
parents of node s, we have Cs(R) = in then s will be accepted provided the nodes in R
are accepted. Moving from abstract dialectical frameworks to meta-argumentation,
we have that Brewka and Woltran [11] represent the support relation a ⇒ b as
acc(a) −→ ¬b −→ b , without posing constraints as we do for deductive support.
We show how we can represent their support relation using meta-argumentation by
means of an example proposed by [11].
First, we have to analyze their arguments against the representation of support
in [13] and our approach as well, since under different aspects we have the same view
of support. Brewka and Woltran [11] present the swimming example, we detailed
in Section 2. The issue here, as discussed in Section 3, is that when an argument
is attacking the conclusion of a support relation, it should also attack the support
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relation. In this case, the reason is that argument c has a temporal dimension that
seems to be disregarded by their model. Consider the arguments of the swimming
example in the following way:
– c0: cloudy now
– r2: rainy later
– w1: windy in between c0 and r2
We have that argument w1 does not attack c0 since it happens later, but it attacks
the support relation among c0 and r2: c0 ⇒ r2. Thus, at the end, we have the following
attacks from argument w1: w1 → (c0 ⇒ r2) and w1 → r2. The second attack relation
is due to the fact that if there is wind then we will have no rain later.
Second, we discuss the difference of our account of support and the one of
abstract dialectical framework. Consider that argument P supports argument C.
The difference is that without the support relation, in our framework, argument C
is acceptable (unless attacked itself) while in Brewka and Woltran [11], argument
C would be not acceptable, if there is no argument P acceptable. This view of the
support relation is close to the notion of issue in Prakken’s terminology [25].
Assume we have multiple supporting arguments Pi and the support relation
Pi ⇒ C. In our approach, we have the following constraint on the acceptability of
the arguments: if there exists an argument Pi which is acceptable, then argument C
is acceptable, and if C is not acceptable then all the arguments Pi are not acceptable
either. In Brewka and Woltran’s [11] approach, if there not exists an argument
Pi which is acceptable then argument C is not acceptable, and if C is acceptable
then there exists an argument Pi which is acceptable too. What is the relation
between these two approaches? We visualize in Fig. 28 the flattened argumentation
frameworks of these two approaches using meta-argumentation. Notice that at the
level of meta-argumentation there is a difference in the structure of the flattened
network and not only in the direction of the arrow of the auxiliary arguments Z and
¬C. In particular, we have that each meta-argument Zi used in our deductive support
is an auxiliary argument different for each argument Pi while meta argument ¬C is
the same meta-argument for each Pi.
P2
P1
C P1 P2zCz
P1 C¬C
P2
(a)
(b)
Fig. 28 Comparison of the flattening for the support relation in the model proposed in this paper
(a), and in abstract dialectical frameworks (b)
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bZa,b Yb,cXb,c
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Zb,a
bZa,b Yb,cXb,c
Fig. 29 Visualization of the bipolar argumentation framework described in Example 12
Example 12 Consider S = {a, b , c}, L = {(a, b), (b , a), (b , c)}, we want (a, b) and
(b , a) to be supporting links, that is we have Ca(∅) = Cb (∅) = out and Ca({b}) =
Cb ({a}) = in, while (b , c) should be an attacking link, that is, Cc(∅) = in and
Cc({b}) = out. Using meta-argumentation, we get two models {a, b} and {c}, as
visualized in Fig. 29. The same holds for Brewka and Woltran [11]. They show also
that, by applying the Gelfond/Lifschitz reduction they get only {c} as stable model.
Finally, we analyze a controversial example proposed by Brewka and Woltran [11]
in which the links among the arguments are neither attacking not supporting link.
Example 13 Let D = ({a, b , c}), {(a, c), (b , c)}, P) with Cc(R) = in iff exactly one of
{a, b} is in. The two links are neither supporting nor attacking. For instance, if b is
out then a supports c, if b is in then a attacks c. We simulate this construction using
the notion of critical subset as proposed in [16]. This example is visualized in Fig. 30.
We have the following four options:
– If argument a is acceptable and argument b is acceptable then meta-arguments
Ua, Ub are not acceptable and meta-argument Y is acceptable and argument c is
not acceptable.
– If both arguments a and b are not acceptable then meta-argument X is accept-
able and so argument c is not acceptable.
– If argument a is not acceptable and argument b is acceptable then meta-
argument X is not acceptable, meta-argument Ua is acceptable and Ub is not
acceptable. Because of Ua is acceptable then we get Y not acceptable. Since both
X and Y are not acceptable then we get argument c acceptable, as desired.
– If argument a is acceptable and argument b is not acceptable then we get meta-
argument X not acceptable and meta-argument Ub is acceptable and meta-
argument Y is not acceptable. Thus, argument c is acceptable, as desired.
The critical subset is {a, b , c} in the set {a, b , c, X, Y, Ua, Ub } which includes both
arguments and meta-arguments.
In Example 13, we show how to translate an abstract dialectical framework in a
meta-argumentation framework where the same constraints are satisfied. We always
have arguments a and b connected to argument c by the arrows which represent the
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Fig. 30 Visualization of the
abstract dialectical framework
described in Example 13
where the links are neither
attacking nor supporting links
a
c
b
c
Y
UbUaX
ba
meta-attack relation but we insert a number of meta-arguments which allow us to
satisfy the constraints. In particular, we can simulate with a construction of this kind
any boolean combination, as previously introduced by [16, 18].
Consider Brewka and Woltran’s [11] abstract dialectical frameworks and the
resulting network (BW). We shall embed it in an ordinary Dung network (DN)
in such a way that the embedding is absolutely faithful. The network DN contains
all the points of BW, and, in addition, DN contains meta-arguments as additional
points.
The embedding is done as follows: consider a part of the network BW as described
in Fig. 31. Argument c is a node in the BW network and arguments a1, . . . , an are all
the other nodes connected to c. We allow for the case that c is one of the ai. We call
c the OUTPUT_ROOT of the network and we call a1, . . . , an the INPUT_LEAVES
of the network. Consider now any new network, like the one visualized in Fig. 32,
containing the nodes a1, . . . , an and the node c and possibly new meta-arguments. In
this case, we can take the network in Fig. 31 out of the network BW and we replace
it by the network in Fig. 32, as follows:
– any connection of any node x in BW such that x is not ai nor is it c, which is
connected to node ai, can be maintained;
– any connection of any node ai to a node x in BW can be maintained;
– any connection of node c to any node x of BW or to node ai can be maintained.
Fig. 31 Construction of a
boolean combination
. . .a1 an
c
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Fig. 32 Construction of
boolean combination Y1 Yk
c
. . . 
By iterating this process, we get a new network. Let us now show how we find
Fig. 32 to replace Fig. 31. In Fig. 31, we have that c is acceptable if and only if
∨
i πi
where each πi is in conjunctive normal form
πi =
n∧
j=1
±xij
where
+xij ≡ a j is acceptable
and
−xij ≡ a j is not acceptable
We now implement ±xij and
∧±xij using meta-variables, i.e., meta-arguments.
We show that every abstract dialectical framework network BW can be repre-
sented as a Dung network DW by using meta-arguments.
Let +xij be replaced by the network
M+ij = a j
Let −xij be replaced by the network
M−ij = a j → αij
Let πi be replaced by the network
Ti = Mi,1 → βi,1 → yi
...
Mi,n → βi,n → yi
Then meta-argument yi is acceptable if and only if all βi are not acceptable and if and
only if for all a j, a j is acceptable if +xij ∈ πi and a j is not acceptable if −xij ∈ πi, and
if and only if πi is true.
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Summarizing, in the network visualized in Fig. 32, if one of the meta-arguments
Yi is acceptable then the meta-argument γ is not acceptable and argument c is
acceptable. Thus, the network visualized in Fig. 32 replaces the network visualized in
Fig. 31.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, a meta-argumentation framework for representing bipolar argumenta-
tion is presented. We start from the drawbacks of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s
meta-argumentation approach and we propose an alternative way of modelling
support using meta-argumentation. We do not take a stance towards the usefulness of
the support relation among arguments, though we show that if one would introduce
it, it can be done without extending Dung’s theory.
We prevent the drawbacks of Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex’s approach by consid-
ering deductive support where given a ⇒ b it holds that: if a is acceptable then b is
acceptable too and if b is not acceptable then a is not acceptable either. Differently
from them, we avoid secondary attacks which may introduce inconsistencies, but we
introduce mediated attacks which help us in avoiding the “loss of admissibility in
Dung’s sense”.
We extend deductive support to defeasible support by allowing second-order
attacks not only on attack relations but also on support relations. Given a ⇒ b and a
second-order attack on this support relation c → (a ⇒ b), we have that the semantics
of deductive support does not hold anymore. In Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex [13],
no attacks on the support relations are introduced, and it has been shown that this
absence leads to undesirable extensions, e.g., in the swimming pool example.
Moreover, different contexts allow to distinguish various kinds of priorities on
support and attack. On the one hand, when the support relation is stronger, then
the supporting argument can attack either the argument attacking the argument it
supports or the attack relation itself. On the other hand, when the attack relation is
stronger, then the attacking argument attacks the supporting argument, i.e., with a
mediated attack or an attack against the support.
We introduce a methodology which makes it possible to define various kinds of
support in a relatively easy way, without the need to introduce additional machinery.
Since there are various kinds of support, it is preferable not to extend argumentation
frameworks, but to instantiate them. We show, for instance, how to represent the
evidence in support of the conclusion of structured arguments and the representation
of arcs which are neither attacking nor supporting, as proposed in abstract dialectical
frameworks [11].
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